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The U.S. forest products industry has witnessed an unprecedented period of
mergers and acquisitions in the last decades. The first part of this thesis evaluated the
impact of the mergers on the financial performance of the U.S. forest products industry
by event study. The results revealed that the equity market reacted positively to these
mergers; the position of a firm and the relative transaction size explained most of the
variations of the cumulative abnormal returns; and the risk for most of the selected 14
acquiring firms had changed after the mergers. The second part examined the market
power of the U.S. paper industry by the new empirical industrial organization approach.
The results indicated that the oligopoly power remained significant at the 1% level over

the whole sample period; whereas the oligopsony power had dropped dramatically and
become insignificant at the 5% level in recent 30 years.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The forest products industry is a significant contributor to the economy of the
United States in terms of annual income and employment. It is also a world leader in the
production, consumption, and trade of forest products. Therefore, the U.S. forest
products industry has been perceived as a major player in both the domestic and global
economic arenas. Most recently, the U.S. forest products industry has become an
interesting area of inquiry because of its economic, social, political, and environmental
underpinnings.
Notwithstanding its importance, the financial performance of the U.S. forest
products industry has been less than impressive in recent decades. Volatility in profits
can be traced to the capital intensity of the industry, competitive behavior, and the effects
of changes in export demands on capacity utilization and prices (Ince 1999). To deal
with the market volatility and the industry’s lackluster stock performance, as pointed by
Wall Street analysts, restructuring in the form of mergers and acquisitions (M&As)
within the industry has been frequent in recent years. Whether the financial performance
had been improved or not due to these M&As has raised great concerns.
As another result of the accelerated consolidation, the U.S. forest products
industry has become more and more concentrated as shown by the ever increasing CR4,
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the share of value of shipments accounted by the largest four companies within the
industry, as reported in the Census of Manufacturing. For certain paper products, such as
newsprint and tissue, the market concentration is even higher. Researchers are suspecting
imperfect competition in either the upstream input market, or the downstream output
market, or even both. Furthermore, the state of the U.S. forest products industry where
production mills are mostly spatially concentrated and distributed in certain geographic
regions also gives credence to the notion that the industry may be in fact exercising some
form of market power (Murray 1995a). Such situation has aroused growing interest in
understanding the market behavior. At present, it is still controversial whether the higher
concentration ratio has led to higher market power or not.
In summary, the considerable contribution of the forest products industry to the
U.S. economy, its strong vertical linkage to timber resources, its volatile performance in
recent decades, and lack of empirical research on its evolution have generated a wide
range of issues that need to be addressed. The overall goal of this thesis is to examine the
financial performance and market behavior in the U.S. forest products industry after the
intensive restructuring activities in the last several decades. The specific objectives are to:
(1) evaluate the impacts of recent M&As on the financial performance of the U.S. forest
products industry; and (2) estimate the market power in the domestic pulpwood input and
paper products output markets over time.
This thesis followed the style of Forest Policy and Economics. From this thesis
two autonomous papers in journal article style were written. The first paper evaluated the
M&As in the U.S. forest products industry in recent decades using event studies. The
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second paper estimated the degree of imperfect competition in the U.S. paper industry
following these M&As by new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) approach. Each
paper is self-contained with its own introduction, background, methodology, data
description, empirical results, and conclusions and discussions.
The thesis was organized as follows. Chapter II contained the first article, entitled
“Event Analysis of the Impact of Mergers and Acquisitions on the Financial Performance
of the U.S. Forest Products Industry.” The financial performance of the publicly traded
firms in the U.S. forest products industry was analyzed using daily return data. Chapter
III contained the second article, entitled “Measuring Oligopsony and Oligopoly Power in
the U.S. Paper Industry.” The degree of imperfect competition in the U.S. paper industry
was examined by employing annual industry-level data from 1955 to 2003 in a state
space model with time-varying parameters (TVPs). Lastly, Chapter IV contained the
summaries and conclusions for the thesis.
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CHAPTER II
EVENT ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
ON THE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF THE
U.S. FOREST PRODUCTS INDUSTRY

Introduction
The forest products industry, which consists of the lumber industry, furniture
industry, and paper industry 1 , has been one of the primary manufacturing sectors in the
United States. According to the latest Economic Census in 2002, the value of shipments
reached $89 billion in the lumber industry, $154 billion in the paper industry, and $78
billion in the furniture industry (U.S. Bureau of Census 2005a). Among the three
industries, the paper industry was the largest, with a 48% share of the total, followed by
the lumber industry with 28% and the furniture industry with 24%. Altogether the value
of shipments from the forest products industry reached $319 billion in 2002; its share in

1

The industry classification system changed from the Standard Industry Classification

(SIC) to the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) in 1997. As a
result, logging has been excluded from the manufacturing sector in NAICS. In this study,
the lumber industry refers to SIC 24/NAICS 321, the paper industry SIC 26/NAICS 322,
and the furniture industry SIC 25/NAICS 337.
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all manufacturing industries was 8.1% in 2002, a slight decrease from the share of 8.6%
in 1992. In 2002, the forest products industry had 1.63 million employees, or 11.1% of
all manufacturing industries (U.S. Bureau of Census 2006a). Based on these statistics,
the forest products industry has long been perceived as a pivotal sector of the U.S.
economy.
Nevertheless, the financial performance of the U.S. forest products industry has
been unstable and weak in recent decades (U.S. Bureau of Census 2006a). At the same
time, increasing restructuring activities in the form of mergers and acquisitions (M&As)
have occurred. Both the frequency and the scale of these consolidations have been
extraordinary in the history of the U.S. forest products industry (Diamond, et al. 1999;
Rudder 2002). These events have raised widespread concerns with regard to the impact
of M&As on the financial performance of individual firms in the U.S. forest products
industry. However, studies related to the recent evolution of the U.S. forest products
industry have been limited. The exceptions are the several studies on the paper and pulp
industry that covered the last three decades (Pesendorfer 2003; Li, et al. 2004; Sun
2006b).
The objective of this study was to evaluate the impact of major M&As in the U.S.
forest products industry from 1990 to 2004 on the financial performance of those firms
involved. Several key techniques from event analysis were employed. Event analysis,
also known as event study, is a methodology to determine the impact of specific financial
decisions on shareholder returns and expected firm profitability. Event analysis provides
researchers a powerful technique to explore the strength of the linkage between
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managerial actions and the creation of firm value (McWilliams and Siegel 1997). In this
study, only publicly traded firms were analyzed because event analysis requires daily
return data. As the first step of the analysis, a database of major M&As announced in the
U.S. forest products industry from 1990 to 2004 was compiled from various sources. For
each of them, party names, announcement date, and transaction payment were recorded.
Then, the abnormal returns (i.e., the difference between predicted returns and actual
returns) for individual firms were measured and aggregated over time and across firms.
The determinants of variations in the cumulative abnormal returns across firms were
investigated by cross-sectional regressions. Finally, the impact of major M&As on the
risk for the selected firms was examined using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).
The key results of these analyses were that the equity market reacted positively to
these M&As in the U.S. forest products industry. The position of a target firm and
relative transaction size explained most of the variations of the cumulative abnormal
returns. The systematic risk for most acquiring firms in whole firm transactions with
costs above $1 billion had changed after the M&As. This study contributes to the
literature of industry evolution and improves our understanding of the status of the U.S.
forest products industry in an increasingly complex and global business environment.

Performance and Restructuring of the
U.S. Forest Products Industry
The performance of the U.S. forest products industry has been volatile in recent
decades, and for some extended periods, particularly weak. The Quarterly Financial
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Report (QFR) for Manufacturing has been published by the U.S. Census Bureau and it
provides aggregate statistics on the financial position of U.S. corporations (U.S. Bureau
of Census 2006a). Based upon extensive sample surveys, the QFR presents estimated
statements of income and balance sheets, and related financial and operating ratios. The
QFR has reported these statistics separately for the three sectors in the U.S. forest
products industry since 1993. In Fig. 2.1, three statistics were shown for the U.S. forest
products industry: sales, profits (i.e., defined by the QFR as the net income after income
taxes), and profit margin (i.e., profits/sales).
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Figure 2.1 Sales, profits, and profit margins of the U.S. forest products industry from
1993 to 2005 (Source: U.S. Bureau of Census (2006a)).
From 1993 to 2005, the sales for the U.S. forest products industry averaged $282
billion annually and varied from $220 to $320 billion. The sales declined from 2000 to
2003 before they increased after 2004. Industry profits averaged $9.5 billion per year.
Considering sales and profits together, the profit margin had been very unstable. Around
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1992, the performance of the U.S. forest products industry, especially the paper industry,
reached the bottom (Rudder 2002; U.S. Bureau of Census 2006a). After that, the industry
had been recovering and attained the highest profit margin at 5.4% in 1995.
Unfortunately, since 1995, industry performance has been even more volatile and its
profit margin decreased to 1.0% in 2001. In contrast, the U.S. economy experienced a
strong economic boom in late 1990s. Overall, the U.S. forest products industry has gone
through declining business cycles and volatile financial performance in the last 15 years.
With the weak and volatile performance, the U.S. forest products industry has
experienced extensive restructuring and consolidations through M&As. While many
transactions focused on a specific mill or a business division, whole firm acquisitions
have become increasingly common. Especially in the last decade, many M&As were so
large and widespread that there were no precedents in the industry history for
comparison. For instance, Kimberly-Clark Corporation acquired Scott Paper Company in
1995 for $9.4 billion; International Paper Company acquired Union Camp Corporation in
1999 for $7.9 billion and Champion International Corporation in 2000 for $9.6 billion;
Georgia-Pacific Corporation acquired Fort James Corporation in 2000 for $11 billion
(Rudder 2002). A widespread concern for the U.S. forest products industry has been
whether these ownership changes have improved the financial performance of these
specific firms.
Research has been limited about M&As in the U.S. forest products industry and
their impacts. Ohanian (1994) examined the vertical integration of pulp and paper mills
between 1900 and 1940 using a transaction cost model. Vertical integration of pulp and
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paper production was positively associated with regional concentration, paper-mill
capacity, and production of standardized grades of paper. Diamond et al. (1999)
compiled a database of the M&As in the U.S. forest products industry from 1995 to 1997.
Ensuring raw materials, diversifying businesses, and securing low costs were reported as
the main causes of these activities. In addition, Pesendorfer (2003) examined M&As in
the U.S. paper and paperboard industry in the 1980s and found that the efficiency of most
acquiring firms increased after an acquisition. Total welfare also increased in some paper
product categories as a result of the mergers.
More recently, using a micro-capacity database, Li, et al. (2004) examined the
effects of size and age on the survival and growth of pulp and paper mills. It was
concluded that the growth of U.S. pulp and paper mills from 1970 to 2000 depended
mostly on size and age. Applying a duration analysis on the same database, Sun (2006b)
examined the duration of U.S. paper mills during the past 30 years. The hazard rate
curve revealed increasing risk of closure during the first seven years for new mills, and
after 18 years for established mills. Larger mills had longer duration and ownership
changes increased the lifetimes of mills.
In summary, previous studies have largely focused on consolidations in the paper
industry and their impacts. Little effort has been spent on the lumber and furniture
industries or the forest products industry as a whole. Given the widespread M&As and
the volatile performance of the U.S. industry in the last decade, there is a great research
need related to the evolution of the U.S. forest products industry (Diamond, et al. 1999).
Using event analysis, the rest of this paper was intended to contribute to this literature by
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evaluating the impact of these M&As on the financial performance of the U.S. forest
products firms.

Methodology
Event analysis is a standard methodology in financial economics to determine the
impact on firm values of specific events such as mergers and acquisitions, earnings
announcements, and changes in regulatory environment (Wells 2004). It is based on the
assumption that individual stock returns over time can be predicted relative to the overall
market. Thus, the abnormal returns (i.e., the difference between predicted returns and
actual returns) for a firm can be evaluated. If the abnormal returns were statistically
different from zero, the null hypothesis that the event under study did not impact stock
returns could be rejected. In this study, the null hypothesis was that the average
cumulative abnormal returns and the change of risk for the selected firms over an event
window were equal to zero. Rejecting the null hypothesis would suggest that these
M&As influenced the financial performance of the U.S. forest products firms under
consideration.
Because of its power to explore the strength of the linkage between the value of
firms and the events, event analysis has been widely employed to examine various issues
since its first application in 1933 (MacKinlay 1997; McWilliams and Siegel 1997). Good
examples related to this research include event studies on corporate acquisitions (Knapp
1990), food safety issues (Salin and Hooker 2001), and forest policy and regulation
(Zhang and Binkley 1995).
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The sophistication level of event analysis has increased greatly since its
appearance in the 1930s (MacKinlay 1997). The following description focuses on the
techniques that were employed to achieve the objectives of this study. The subsequent
analysis has five major components: (1) identifying the event of interest and defining
event windows; (2) measuring abnormal returns for an individual firm and aggregating
them over time; (3) aggregating abnormal returns across firms; (4) analyzing the
determinants of the cumulative abnormal returns by cross-sectional regressions; and (5)
examining the impact of the M&As on firms’ risk.
Events and Event Windows
In general, event analysis begins with identifying the events of interest. For those
events identified, event windows can be defined. The event window can include the
event date only (i.e., t1 = 0, t2 = 0), or as long as 20 days prior to and after the event day
(i.e., t1 = -20, t2 = 20). It is typical to set the event window to be larger than one day.
This facilitates the analysis of abnormal returns surrounding the event day (MacKinlay
1997). In addition, time before the event window is termed as the estimation window and
up to one year can be included assuming there is no other event occurred for that period
of time; time after the event window is referred to as the post-event window.
In this study, the events of interest were the major M&As related to the U.S.
forest products industry from 1990 to 2004. Following previous studies (e.g., Lepetit, et
al. 2004), the length of observation interval was set to one trading day. Four alternative
event windows were used in this study: (t1, t2) = (-1, 1), (-3, 3), (-5, 5), and (-7, 7).
Correspondingly, the length of the event windows or the total number of days (i.e., T = t2
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– t1 +1) was 3, 7, 11, or 15 days. For each event, the estimation window covered 200
days before the event window. The post-event windows were used in the risk analysis
only and three lengths were employed: 50, 100, and 150 days after the event window.
Abnormal Returns for an Individual Firm
The main task of event analysis is to measure the abnormal return associated with
a firm in an event. The abnormal return is the actual return minus the normal return of
the firm over the event window. The normal return is defined as the expected return, had
the event not occurred. Market model considers the market-wide effect with a risk
adjustment component, and is often employed for this purpose:
Rit = α i + β i Rmt + ε it

(2-1)

where Rit is the return of firm i on day t; Rmt represents the return of a market portfolio;

α i and β i are the parameters to be estimated; t in this equation indexes a day over the
estimation window; and ε it is the mean zero disturbance term. In this study, the valueweighted S&P 500 Index was chosen as the proxy of the market portfolio.
The above equation is usually applied on a firm over the estimation window to
generate α̂ and βˆ . Then, the abnormal return ( Ait ) of firm i on day t over an event

window can be calculated as:

Ait = Rit − αˆi − βˆi Rmt

(2-2)

where t in this case indicates a date over the event window in this equation ( t1 ≤ t ≤ t2 or
1 ≤ t ≤ T ). Under the null hypothesis that the event has no impact on the returns, Ait has
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a normal distribution (MacKinlay 1997). In actual estimation, Ait is just the predicted
residual of the market model on an out-of-sample basis 2 .
This abnormal return ( Ait ) can be aggregated for firm i over the entire event
window as:
T

CiT = ∑ Ait

(2-3)

t =1

where CiT is the cumulative abnormal returns for firm i over event window T; and the
word “cumulative” indicates aggregation over time. If the event had no impact on the
returns for the firm, the expected value of CiT should be zero. When the estimation
window is large, the variance of CiT can be asymptotically measured as:

Var(CiT ) = Tσ ε2it

2

(2-4)

The abnormal returns also could be estimated for many firms simultaneously using the

Seemly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model. Since most of the M&As that were
considered in this study took place in different years and had weak linkages among each
others, it was assumed that there was no contemporaneous correlation between the error
terms, and Ait was estimated independently for each firm. In actual estimation, the SUR
model was applied for the selected 14 M&As. However, with Breusch-Pagan test we
could not reject the null hypothesis that there is no contemporaneous covariance,
suggesting Ordinary Least Square is adequate.
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where T is the length of the event window and σ ε2it is the variance of the disturbance term
in the market model. Under the null hypothesis, CiT has a normal distribution and the
hypothesis of CiT = 0 can be examined (MacKinlay 1997).
Abnormal Returns across Firms

In the case of multiple events, the above examination of cumulative abnormal
returns for individual firms can be aggregated across firms. This is necessary because
tests with multiple events are more convincing. One way to examine the overall impact
of multiple events in an industry is to calculate the average cumulative abnormal returns
as follows:
GNT =

1
N

N

∑C

(2-5)

iT

i =1

where GNT is the average cumulative abnormal returns for N firms as a group over the Tday event window, and the word “average” indicates calculating an average across firms.
For N firms and a T-day event window, there is only one point estimate of GNT.
Substituting Eq. (2-3) into Eq. (2-5) and rearranging the terms, GNT also can be
measured in another way as follows:
GNT =

1
N

N

⎛

⎞

T

∑ ⎜⎝ ∑ A ⎟⎠
i =1

⎛1
= ∑⎜
t =1 ⎝ N
T

δ

t =1

it

⎞

N

∑ A ⎟⎠
i =1

it

⎛1
= ∑⎜
t =1 ⎝ N

⎞ T ⎛1
A
∑
it ⎟ + ∑ ⎜
i =1
⎠ t =δ +1 ⎝ N

= H Nδ +

∑
⎜ ∑A ⎟
δ ⎝ N
⎠

N

T

t = +1

⎛1

⎞

N

i =1

⎞
Ait ⎟
∑
i =1
⎠
N

it
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(2-6)

where HNδ is the average cumulative abnormal returns for N firms up to day δ over the
event window; and δ is a specific day in the event window ( 1 ≤ δ ≤ T ). HNδ has an
estimate for each specific day in the event window, and when δ = T, HNδ = GNT. Thus,
HNδ decomposes GNT and allows a detailed examination of the impact of events over the
event window. The evolution of HNδ over time is often demonstrated graphically
(MacKinlay 1997).
With the assumption of asymptotically normal distribution, the variance of the
average cumulative abnormal returns (GNT) for the sample firms can be calculated and its
statistical significance can be tested by the z statistic as follows:
Var (GNT ) =

z=

1
N2

N

∑Var(C

)

(2-7)

GNT
~ N (0, 1).
Var (GNT )

(2-8)

i =1

iT

This distributional result is asymptotic with respect to the number of firms and the length
of the estimation window (Campbell, et al. 1997).
Cross-sectional Regression

While aggregating the abnormal returns across firms allows testing the hypothesis
about the overall impact of these M&As, examining the association between the
magnitudes of the cumulative abnormal returns (CiT) and the characteristics specific to
the event observations can provide additional insights into the determinants of the
cumulative abnormal returns. The approach employed in this study was to estimate a
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cross-sectional regression of the cumulative abnormal returns on the characteristics of
firms as follows:
CiT = λ0 + λ1Partyi + λ2Wholei + λ3 ROAi + λ4 Sizei + λ5Timei + ηi

(2-9)

where CiT is the cumulative abnormal returns for firm i over the T-day event window;
λ ’s are coefficients; and ηi is the mean zero error term.

Following previous studies (MacKinlay 1997; Choi and Russell 2004), five
explanatory variables were included in this study. First, two dummy variables were
constructed to differentiate these events. Party indicated the party position in the M&As
with 1 for acquiring firms and 0 for target firms. Whole equaled 1 for those involved in
whole firm acquisitions and 0 otherwise. Second, ROA was the return on assets for firm i.
Size was the relative transaction size, defined as the ratio of the transaction size over the
total asset of firm i. Finally, the time trend variable Time was set as the difference
between the year of announcement and 1989 (i.e., Time = 1 for 1990 and 15 for 2004),
and used as an index of the macroeconomic situation.
Risk Analysis

Risk of the involved firms may also change after the M&As. A comparison of the
statistical estimates of systematic risk before and after the M&As can be supplementary
to the analysis of abnormal returns. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is often
employed to measure the risk with the following econometric representation (Jensen
1969):

Rit − R ft = α i + β i ( Rmt − R ft ) + μ i

(2-10)
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where Rit and Rmt are realized returns at time t on asset i and the market portfolio m,
respectively; Rft is the return on a risk-free asset at time t; and the error term μi has normal
distribution with mean zero, constant variance, and serial independence. The parameter

β i is often referred to as asset i’s beta and measures its systematic risk.
In this study, to determine the difference in beta values for an individual firm
before and after the M&As, a dummy variable Di was introduced as follows:

Rit − R ft = α i + β i ( Rmt − R ft ) + γ i Di ( Rmt − R ft ) + μ i

(2-11)

where Di equaled 0 for the days before the M&A and 1 on the announcement day and
thereafter. γ i was the coefficient for the interaction term and captured the change in the
firm’s systematic risk after the M&As. For above regressions, three alternative windows
of 50, 100, and 150 days were used.

Data Sources

Information of M&As related to the U.S. forest products industry has been diffuse
and no single source had a complete coverage of these events. In this study, various
sources were examined in compiling the M&A database. Those that had been searched
thoroughly included the online newspaper databases (i.e., EBSCO Newspaper Source)
and major daily news outlets (i.e., the Wall Street Journal and New York Times). Other
sources included industry publications such as Pulp & Paper 2002 North American Fact

Book (Rudder 2002). The study by Diamond et al. (1999) also provided additional
references.
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Several criteria were used in the screening process because a large number of
M&As related to the U.S. forest products industry were identified. First, the time period
considered was from 1990 to 2004. December 2004 was chosen as the end date in order
to exclude those proposed but still pending M&As and also to have enough days for postevent windows. Second, only those publicly traded firms were included because daily
stock prices in the equity market were needed for the proposed statistical analysis. Third,
some events were dropped in the screening process because their transaction sizes were
not disclosed. Finally, to select events that had impacted the market widely, the
transaction size was used as a filter. In the end, only M&As with transaction sizes of at
least $100 million were included in the M&A database for this study.
For each event, five items were collected: announcement date, acquiring firm,
target firm, transaction size in billion dollars, and a brief description of the M&As. The
date of announcement was determined by the date of the first mention of the M&A
agreement on the Wall Street Journal. Daily returns without dividend were obtained
directly from the database of the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). As the
proxy of the market portfolio, the value-weighted S&P 500 Index was also collected from
the CRSP database.
For the cross-sectional regression, the dummy variables and the time trend
variable were defined in the M&A database. In addition, the return on assets and total
assets of each firm were obtained from the financial database COMPUSTAT, based on the
fiscal year-end data preceding the M&As. Finally, for the risk analysis, the risk-free rate
of return was measured by the secondary market rate of 3-month U.S. T-bills. It was
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collected from the database that has been maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis (http://stlouisfed.org. Accessed on September 20, 2006).

Empirical Results

The final M&A database comprised 70 events, as shown in Table 2.1. Some
firms such as International Paper have been involved in more than one M&A either on
the acquiring or the target side. As a result, the number of distinct firms involved in the
70 M&As was 49 on the acquiring side, 51 on the target side, and 85 on both sides. The
transaction size ranged from $0.105 billion to $11 billion. For the 70 M&As together, the
total transaction payment was about $114 billion.
The following empirical results were described in three groups: (1) results from
the abnormal return analyses, (2) results from the cross sectional regressions, and (3)
results from the risk analyses.
Results from the Abnormal Return Analyses

All the U.S. forest products firms listed in Table 2.1 were included in the
abnormal return analysis except for private companies or investment groups without
financial data. In addition, several firms were also dropped because of the poor fitness of
the market model by the F-statistics. In the end, the analyses of abnormal returns were
conducted for 39 acquiring firms, 51 target firms, and 90 firms in all.
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Table 2.1
Announcement dates, parties, and transaction payments for the major M&As in the U.S.
forest products industry from 1990 to 2004
N
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Date
1990-03-01
1994-10-11
1995-02-23
1995-05-17
1995-07-17
1995-10-27
1995-11-07
1995-11-10
1996-02-29

Acquiring firm
Georgia-Pacific Corp.
Sappi Ltd. (South Africa)
Noranda Forest Inc. (Canada)
Delcor Inc. (Britain)
Kimberly-Clark Corp.
Clayton Dubilier & Rice Inc.
International Paper Co.
Georgia-Pacific Corp.
Weyerhaeuser Co.

10 1996-03-07 R-H timber Co.
11 1996-03-13 Willamette Industries Inc.
12 1996-05-31 Florida Coast Paper Co.
13 1996-07-24 U.S. Timberlands Co.
14 1996-08-08 Plum Creek Timber Co.
15 1996-10-01 Mead Corp.
16 1996-12-17 Alliance Forest Product Inc.
(Canada)
17 1996-12-23 Rock-Tenn Co.
18 1996-12-27 Sierra-Pacific Holding Co.
19 1997-02-28 Hancock Timber Group
20 1997-04-03 St. Laurent Paperboard Inc.
21 1997-05-05 James River Corp.
22 1997-07-10 Consolidated Papers Inc.
23 1997-08-05 Forest Investment Associates
24 1997-08-25 Wausau Paper Mills Co.
25 1997-09-16 Crown Pacific Partners LP
26 1998-01-23 Plainwell Inc.
27 1998-02-03 International Paper Co.
28 1998-03-03 Huhtamaki (Finland)
29 1998-03-10 Bowater Inc.
30 1998-03-24 Donohue Inc. (Canada)
31 1998-03-31 Georgia-Pacific Corp.
32 1998-05-11 Jefferson Smurfit Corp.
33 1998-06-19 International Paper Co.
34 1998-08-05 Weyerhaeuser Co.
35 1998-11-25 International Paper Co.
36 1999-01-27 Madison Dearborn Partners
Inc.
37 1999-03-05 Caraustar Industries Inc.

Target firm
Payment
Great Northern Nekoosa Corp.
3.80
Scott Paper Co. (S.D. Warren Co.)
1.60
Pentair Inc. (Cross Pointe Paper)
0.20
National Gypsum Co.
1.20
Scott Paper Co.
9.40
Riverwood International Corp.
1.60
Federal Paper Board Co.
3.60
Domtar Inc. (wallboard division)
0.35
Hanson P.L.C. (Cavenham Forest Industries, sawmill 0.50
& timberland)
International Paper Co. (timberland from IP
0.91
Timberlands Ltd.)
Hanson P.L.C. (Cavenham Forest Industries, sawmill 1.60
& timberland)
St. Joe Paper Co. (mill & plant)
0.36
Weyerhaeuser Co. (timberland & plant)
0.31
Riverwood International Corp. (timberland, sawmill
0.54
& plant)
Boise Cascade Corp. (paper mill & timberland)
0.65
Kimberly-Clark Corp. (paper mill & timberland)
0.60
Waldorf Corp. (two boxboard mills)
Georgia-Pacific Corp. (timberland, sawmill & plant)
James River Corp. (timberland)
Chesapeake Corp. (kraft mill & 4 box plants)
Fort Howard Corp.
Repap Enterprises Inc. (Canada, coated paper mill)
International Paper Co. (timberland)
Mosinee Paper Corp.
Trillium Corp. (timberland)
Pope & Talbot Inc. (tissue business)
Weston Paper and Manufacturing Co.
Sealright Co. (most operations)
Avenor Inc.
Champion International Corp. (newsprint mill)
CeCorr Inc.
Stone Container Corp.
Mead Corp. (Zellerbach distribution business)
Bowater Inc. (uncoated free sheet mill)
Union Camp Corp.
Tenneco Inc. (containerboard business)

0.41
0.32
0.11
0.51
3.40
0.67
0.20
0.44
0.15
0.15
0.23
0.16
2.47
0.45
0.28
2.30
0.26
0.52
7.90
2.20

International Paper Co. (boxboard mill)

0.11

Transaction payments were in $ billion. Data were compiled from various publications.
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Table 2.1
(continued)
N
38
39
40
41

Date
1999-03-08
1999-04-27
1999-05-26
1999-06-22

Acquiring firm
Chesapeake Corp.
Graphic Packaging Corp.
Georgia-Pacific Corp.
Blue Ridge Paper Products
Inc.
42 1999-06-22 Weyerhaeuser Co.
43 1999-06-28 Georgia-Pacific Corp.
44 1999-07-27 Sonoco Products Co.
45 1999-07-30 Rayonier Inc.
46 1999-09-24 Southeast Paper
Manufacturing Co.
47 1999-10-05 Westvaco Corp.
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

1999-11-29
2000-02-17
2000-02-23
2000-02-24
2000-03-31
2000-05-12
2000-07-14
2000-07-19
2000-10-03
2000-10-16
2001-01-23
2001-03-08

60 2001-04-02
61 2001-05-01
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

2001-08-29
2001-10-01
2002-01-22
2002-02-08
2002-03-19
2002-07-25
2002-08-15

69 2004-04-22
70 2004-07-22
Total

Target firm
Field Group PLC (Britain)
Fort James Corp. (carton business)
Unisource Worldwide Inc. (paper distribution)
Champion International Corp. (bleached board mill
and packaging business)
MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. (Canada)
Chesapeake Corp. (Wisconsin Tissue Mills)
Graphic Packaging Corp. (flexible packaging
business)
Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. (timberland)
Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. (newsprint mill)

Payment
0.36
0.83
1.24
0.20
2.45
0.73
0.11
0.73
0.22

Temple Inland Inc. (Inland Eastex bleached board
0.63
mill)
Westvaco Corp.
Mebane Packaging Group Inc.
0.20
International Paper Co.
Shorewood Packaging Corp.
0.88
Stora Enso (Sweden)
Consolidated Papers Inc.
4.80
Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. St. Laurent Paperboard Inc.
1.40
Angelini Group (Chile)
International Paper Co. (Chilean equity investments)
1.30
International Paper Co.
Champion International Corp.
9.60
Bowater Inc.
Newsprint South Inc.
0.37
Plum Creek Timber Co.
Georgia-Pacific Corp. (Timber Co.)
4.00
Premdor Inc. (Canada)
International Paper Co. (Masonite Corp.)
0.50
Georgia-Pacific Corp.
Fort James Corp.
11.00
SCA (Sweden)
Georgia-Pacific Corp. (tissue division)
0.85
FiberMark Inc.
Rexam PLC (Britain, coated films & paper
0.14
subsidiary)
Bowater Inc.
Alliance Forest Product Inc. (Canada)
1.20
Domtar Inc.
Georgia-Pacific Corp. (4 uncoated free-sheet paper
1.65
mills)
Westvaco Corp.
Mead Corp.
3.00
Temple-Inland Inc.
Gaylord Container Corp.
0.87
Weyerhaeuser Co.
Willamette Industries Inc.
7.80
Nexfor Inc. (Canada)
International Paper Co. (oriented strand board assets) 3.00
Sappi Ltd. (South Africa)
Potlatch Corp. (coated papers business)
0.48
Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. MeadWestvaco Corp. (plant & timberland)
0.38
Bain Capital Inc.
Georgia-Pacific Corp. (Unisource Worldwide Inc.
0.85
paper distribution)
International Paper Co.
Box USA Holding Inc.
0.40
West Fraser Timber Co.
International Paper Co. (Weldwood of Canada Ltd.)
1.40
(Canada)
49 distinct firms
51distinct firms
114.00

Transaction payments were in $ billion. Data were compiled from various publications.
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The statistical significance of GNT was evaluated by the z statistic in Table 2.2.
The results of HNδ for the 15-day event window were depicted in Fig. 2.2. For both GNT
and HNδ, the analyses were conducted for all the 90 firms, and then stratified by the party
positions (i.e., 39 acquiring and 51 target firms). By the z statistic, for all the 90 firms as
a group, GNT was 3.03%, 2.49%, and 2.19% for 3-day, 7-day, and 11-day event window
respectively and significant at the 1% level. GNT for 15-day event window was 1.66%
and significant at the 10% level (Table 2.2). The estimates of HNδ over the 15-day event
window for this group in Fig. 2.2 indicated a sharp growth of the average cumulative
abnormal returns from day -2 to day 1. The increase did not exactly start on day 0, i.e.,
the announcement day, because there might be some leakage about the M&A news
before it was formally announced. As a result, this information had already been
captured and reflected by the stock market under the efficient market hypothesis. After
day 1, HNδ remained at a higher level around 2%. At the end of the window, it reached
1.66%, which was equal to the point estimate of GNT. Therefore, the null hypothesis that

GNT was zero for the 90 firms as a group should be rejected.
For the 39 acquiring firms as a sub-group, GNT was negative for the 3-day and 15day event window and positive for 7-day and 11-day event window. However, none of
the estimates was significant by the z statistic. Therefore, the null hypothesis that GNT
was zero for the acquiring firms could not be rejected. For the 51 target firms as another
sub-group, GNT ranged from 3.76% for the 11-day window to 5.47% for the 3-day
window. The z statistic revealed that the estimates were highly significant at 1% level.
The graph for this sub-group in Fig. 2.2 showed a similar pattern to that for the 90 firms
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as a group. Thus, the null hypothesis that GNT was zero for the target firms should be
rejected.
Table 2.2
Average cumulative abnormal returns (GNT) for N firms as a group over an event window
for the selected M&As in the U.S. forest products industry from 1990 to 2004
Event window
3 days: (-1, 1)
7 days: (-3, 3)
11 days: (-5, 5)
15 days: (-7, 7)

Average cumulative abnormal returns (GNT)
All firms (N = 90)
3.03%
2.49%
2.19%
1.66%

3 days: (-1, 1)
7 days: (-3, 3)
11 days: (-5, 5)
15 days: (-7, 7)

Acquiring firms (N = 39)
-0.17%
0.07%
0.14%
-1.40%

3 days: (-1, 1)
7 days: (-3, 3)
11 days: (-5, 5)
15 days: (-7, 7)

Target firms (N = 51)
5.47%
4.34%
3.76%
4.01%

z statistic
7.02*
3.79*
2.66*
1.73‡
-0.28
0.08
0.12
-1.03
9.12*
4.75*
3.28*
2.99*

z statistics were from two-tailed tests.
*

significant at the 1% level.

‡

significant at the 10% level.

Overall, the results of the abnormal returns were consistent with the conclusions
in the M&A literature (Dodd 1980; Halpern 1983; Choi and Russell 2004). The capital
markets reacted positively to the M&As in the U.S. forest products industry and
improved firms’ market value for the target firms. The gain was statistically significant
to the target firms while not to the acquiring firms. When all the firms were grouped
together, the gain was not as significant as that for the target firms.
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Figure 2.2 Average cumulative abnormal returns ( H Nδ ) up to a specific day over the 15day event window for N firms involved in the major M&As in the U.S. forest
products industry from 1990 to 2004.
Results from the Cross-sectional Regressions

In the cross-sectional regressions, four observations were dropped because firm
level financial data (return on assets and total assets) were not available from

COMPUSTAT. In the end, 86 observations were used. Of the variables included in the
regressions, the mean for the dummy representing party position (Party) was 0.45,
indicating 45% of the firms considered in the regression were acquiring firms. Similarly,
the mean for Whole was 0.42 so 42% firms were involved in whole firm M&As. In
addition, the mean was 2.50% for the return on assets (ROA), 0.40 for the relative
transaction size (Size), and 9.45 for the time trend (Time).
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A regression was estimated for each of the four alternative event windows (Table
2.3). Since the regression was cross-sectional, the White’s heteroscedasticity consistent
standard errors were used in the evaluation. Given the complexity of these M&As and
the equity market, the model had a relatively good fit. For 3-day, 7-day, 11-day, and 15day event windows, the R2 ranged from 0.25 to 0.32, while the value around 0.10 was
reported in previous studies (e.g., Asquith, et al. 1983). The F-statistics were also
significant at the 1% level for all these event windows.

Table 2.3
Results from the cross-sectional regressions of cumulative abnormal returns (CiT) on the
characteristics of selected 86 firms by different event windows

Constant
Party
Whole
ROA
Size
Time

3-day CiT
Coeff.
t-value
-0.038
-1.14
-0.075
-2.53†
0.053
1.56
0.000
-0.03
0.052
1.96‡
0.007
1.69‡

7-day CiT
Coeff.
t-value
-0.033
-0.81
-0.064
-2.21†
0.053
1.49
0.001
0.45
0.061
1.52
0.004
1.09

11-day CiT
Coeff.
t-value
-0.023
-0.47
-0.059
-1.86‡
0.057
1.46
0.000
0.14
0.071
1.83†
0.002
0.49

15-day CiT
Coeff.
t-value
-0.027
-0.61
-0.079
-2.28†
0.072
1.89‡
0.000
-0.10
0.081
2.40†
0.002
0.54

Obs. No.
R2
F-statistic

86
0.25
5.36*

86
0.29
6.49*

86
0.25
5.31*

86
0.32
7.55*

Variable

*

significant at the 1% level.

†

significant at the 5% level.

‡

significant at the 10% level.

The results for the four event windows were similar. Party and Size were found
the factors that contributed most to the variations of the cumulative abnormal returns
(CiT). The coefficients for these variables were significant at the 10% level or better
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except for the 7-day event window. The negative estimates for Party confirmed the
conclusion from the above abnormal return analyses that the CiT for the target firms was
larger than that for the acquiring firms. The positive estimates of Size indicated that as
the relative transaction size increased, the equity market generally showed more positive
reactions.
Results from the Risk Analyses

In risk analyses, 14 whole firm M&As with transaction sizes above $1 billion
were selected. Only the acquiring firms were analyzed because the target firms in these
transactions were no longer listed in the stock market after the M&As and no daily return
data were available for them thereafter. As a measure of the systematic risk, the beta
values estimated by CAPM for each firm were compared 50, 100 and 150 days before
and after the M&As (Table 2.4).
For 50 days before and after the M&As, the systematic risk of two out of 14 firms
increased significantly. For 100 days before and after the M&As, the systematic risk of
five firms decreased significantly, whereas the risk of other two firms increased
significantly. For 150 days before and after the M&As, the systematic risk of four firms
decreased significantly, whereas that of another firm increased significantly. The
increases in systematic risk were related to these three M&As:
Jefferson Smurfit Corporation vs. Stone Container Corporation in 1998,
Weyerhaeuser Company vs. MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. (Canada) in 1999, and
Westvaco Corporation vs. Mead Corporation in 2001.
The decreases in risk were related to these six M&As:
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Kimberly-Clark Corporation vs. Scott Paper Company in 1995,
James River Corporation vs. Fort Howard Corporation in 1997,
International Paper Company vs. Union Camp Corporation in 1998,
Georgia-Pacific Corporation vs. Fort James Corporation in 2000,
Bowater Incorporation. vs. Alliance Forest Product Incorporation (Canada) in
2001, and
Weyerhaeuser Company vs. Willamette Industries Incorporation in 2002.

Table 2.4
A comparison of 14 firms’ risk before and after the M&As using the Capital Asset
Pricing Model by three alternative post-event windows (50, 100, 150 days)
Year

Acquiring firm

1990
1995
1995
1997
1998
1998
1998
1999
2000
2000
2000
2001
2001
2002

Georgia-Pacific Corp.
International Paper Co.
Kimberly-Clark Corp.
James River Corp.
Bowater Inc.
International Paper Co.
Jefferson Smurfit Corp.
Weyerhaeuser Co.
Georgia-Pacific Corp.
International Paper Co.
Smurfit-Stone Container Corp.
Bowater Inc.
Westvaco Corp.
Weyerhaeuser Co.

*

significant at the 1% level.

†

significant at the 5% level.

‡

significant at the 10% level.

βi
50
1.165*
1.385
1.169*
1.009*
1.056*
0.517*
0.853†
0.235
0.671*
0.537†
1.563*
0.748*
0.998*
0.964*

100
0.961*
0.947†
0.848*
0.786*
0.748*
0.610*
1.310*
0.349†
0.668*
0.620*
1.454*
0.682*
1.059*
1.091*
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γi
150
0.931*
0.836*
0.738*
0.798*
0.721*
0.567*
1.225*
0.426*
0.791*
0.640*
1.419*
0.784*
0.956*
0.961*

50
-0.014
-0.281
-0.043
-0.040
-0.023
-0.065
0.306†
0.159
-0.118
0.018
-0.105
-0.009
0.207‡
-0.146

100
-0.041
-0.158
-0.034
-0.075‡
0.010
-0.119‡
0.146‡
0.124‡
-0.138‡
-0.024
-0.059
-0.112‡
0.087
-0.232†

150
0.001
-0.115
-0.051‡
-0.001
0.028
-0.142†
0.089
0.113‡
-0.126†
-0.024
-0.047
-0.082
0.065
-0.132†

Overall, changes in systematic risk are a reasonable economic result of M&As.
While the unsystematic risk of a firm is diversifiable, systematic risk can change over
time with the variation of business environment related to individual firms and industries.
Thus, for a forest products firm involved in a M&A, its systematic risk may change
significantly, depending on its original risk, the risk of the other firm in the transaction,
managerial issues related to the new firm, the industry-wide performance, and other
macroeconomic factors. For example, some of the M&As were involved in antitrust
investigations; others were boycotted by the target firm right after the proposed deal. In
summary, the risk for most of the selected 14 forest products firms had changed after the
M&As. The changes in risk reflected the reaction of stock market to these big M&As
and the evaluation on their financial performance.

Conclusions

The U.S. forest products industry has experienced volatile and weak performance
in recent years, and consequently increasing restructuring and consolidation through
M&As. In this study, the impact of major M&As from 1990 to 2004 on the financial
performance of the U.S. forest products firms was examined. With a transaction size of
at least $100 million, 70 M&As related to the U.S. forest products industry were
identified from various sources. Several methods were employed in the evaluation,
including the analyses of abnormal returns, the determinants of cumulative abnormal
returns, and the risk changes brought by the M&As.
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The average cumulative abnormal returns for all the 90 firms ranged from 1.66%
to 3.03% over four alternative event windows and were significant at the 10% level or
better. This revealed that the equity market reacted positively to these M&As in the U.S.
forest products industry. However, the gain was not equal with respect to acquiring firms
and target firms. While the average cumulative abnormal returns over four alternative
event windows were significantly improved for the target firms, they were not for the
acquiring firms. This indicated that these M&As in the U.S. forest products industry, at
least in the short run, brought considerable increases to the target firms’ market values
and were beneficial to their shareholders. For the acquiring firms, the results appear to be
broadly consistent with value maximization strategies. In many M&As, the acquiring
firms already had some share ownership of the target firms. Any gains from the merger
might have been reflected in the acquiring firm’s stock price when the prior ownership
was obtained. In addition, many acquiring firms were larger than the target firms so the
impact on the former might have been swamped by random noise over the measurement
period. Furthermore, the motivation of many M&As for the acquiring firms might be
related to their long term strategies, such as gaining market power in input or output
markets. All these factors are beyond the explanatory capability of the short-term event
analysis employed in this study.
Based on the cross-sectional regressions, the position of a firm in the M&A and
the relative transaction size explained most of the variations of the cumulative abnormal
return. The cross-sectional regressions further confirmed that the cumulative abnormal
returns for the individual target firms were larger than those for the acquiring firms.
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Considering the complex structure of the equity market, other factors beyond the
specification in this study may need further analyses in the future. In addition, the risk
analyses for the acquiring firms in the selected 14 M&As revealed that the risk for most
of them had changed after the M&As.
It should be noted that the analyses in this study focused on the average
cumulative abnormal returns on selected firms as a group. It is always possible that an
individual firm might gain or lose value because of the M&As involved. In addition, the
methodology employed in this study emphasized the impact of M&As on the financial
performance of the U.S. forest products firms in the short run. In the long term, various
factors may influence the financial performance as well as the systematic risk of
individual forest products firms. Whether and how these consolidation and restructuring
activities have improved the strength of the U.S. forest products industry in the long term
is an important research question beyond the objectives of this study.
Overall, by applying event analysis to M&As in the U.S. forest products industry,
this research advances our understanding of the gain and risk from the consolidations that
occurred in recent years, and it also sheds light on ongoing and future restructuring
activities in the industry. Nevertheless, many questions specifically related to the
evolution in the U.S. forest products industry still have not been addressed yet. Future
research can examine whether these restructuring activities have changed the market
power of the major forest products firms, whether they have increased the
competitiveness of the whole industry domestically and internationally, and furthermore,
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how the consolidation in the industry has influenced the welfare of forest landowners in
the timber market.
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CHAPTER III
MEASURING OLIGOPSONY AND OLIGOPOLY POWER
IN THE U.S. PAPER INDUSTRY

Introduction

The forest products industry in the United States has been a major player in the
domestic and global economies in terms of production, consumption, and trade of forest
products (U.S. Bureau of Census 2005b). It has provided numerous job opportunities and
generated income in billion dollars. The U.S. forest products industry is usually divided
into three sub-industries: the lumber industry (NAICS 321 or SIC 24), the furniture
industry (NAICS 337 or SIC 25), and the paper industry (NAICS 322 or SIC 26). The
paper industry has been the largest in terms of the value of shipments and employment.
According to the latest Annual Survey of Manufacturing in 2005 (U.S. Bureau of Census
2005b), the value of shipments for the paper industry reached $163 billion, or 45% of the
total output of the forest products industry, and the employment totaled 429,000.
The paper industry has several distinct characteristics. First of all, as the raw
material for paper mills, pulpwood timber is bulky to transport. On average, two-thirds
of the delivered price for pine pulpwood are accounted by harvesting and transportation
costs (Guo, et al. 2007). The prohibitive costs of transporting bulky timber materials can
mitigate the forces necessary to support perfect competition within the paper industry
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(Murray 1995a; Love and Burton 1999). In addition, the paper industry has been a
capital-intensive manufacturing sector in the U.S. economy (Ince 1999). High capital
costs are partly due to the capital recovery and fixed costs as a large component of
manufacturing costs, and partly due to the stringent environmental regulations on the
paper industry, which has created barriers to entry and also encouraged mergers and
acquisitions in the forest products industry (Gomez 1997).
The U.S. paper industry has become increasingly concentrated over time as
indicated by CR4, the share of value of shipments accounted by the largest four
companies within the industry. The CR4 for the paper industry was 18% in 1954 and
reached 49% in 2002 (U.S. Bureau of Census 2006b). This situation has been further
aggravated by large mergers observed in recent decades (Mei and Sun 2007). Overall,
the evolution of the paper industry has made it structurally concentrated with relatively
few processing firms, a large number of forest landowners, and numerous paper products
consumers. Such an industry structure has aroused wide concerns about the potential
market power.
The paper industry has been suspected of both oligopsony power in the input
market of pulpwood and oligopoly power in the output market of paper products
(Bernstein 1992). In an oligopsony pulpwood input market the paper and paperboard
mills may depress the price lower, whereas in an oligopoly paper products market they
may raise the price higher than that in a competitive market. Consequently, the paper and
paperboard mills would gain a positive markup with the value of the marginal revenue for
paper products exceeding the marginal cost for pulpwood input. If there is market power
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in the U.S. paper industry, it indicates a welfare transfer from pulpwood suppliers and
paper products consumers to the paper processors.
The objective of this study was to measure the market power in the U.S. paper
industry in both the input and output markets from 1955 to 2003. This study had three
contributions to the literature of market power related to the U.S. paper industry. First,
previous studies usually estimated a static model with an average market power index for
one time period. This study was innovative in employing a state space model to measure
the time-varying market power index over time. Second, previous studies usually
focused on the input market power only, while this study examined the potential market
power in both the input and output markets simultaneously. Third, the time period has
been extended to the most recent years, which allowed an exploration of the evolution of
the market power over time. Results from this study will be helpful in understanding the
market behavior of the U.S. paper industry.

Background

Market power possessed by industrial firms has been an issue of great interest.
Geroski (1988), Bresnahan (1989), Kadiyali, et al. (2001) and Digal and AhmadiEsfahani (2002) provided excellent reviews of empirical approaches in the market power
literature. Overall, there have been two major methods, i.e., the structure-conductperformance paradigm (SCPP) and new empirical industrial organization (NEIO)
approach. Prior to 1980’s, the SCPP was the dominant approach. Based on the
assumption that the level of competition could be implied by an industry’s structural
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features, the SCPP tried to establish a direct link from industry structure to conduct. Yet,
the SCPP was criticized later because the relationship between industry structure and
conduct was not unambiguously predicted by the theory of imperfect competition, and
high concentration in an industry did not necessarily imply noncompetitive behavior
(Ronnila and Toppinen 2000).
To study the existence of market power more rigorously, researchers have
gradually turned to the NEIO approach. One prominent component of the NEIO
approach is to estimate the conjectural elasticities, also defined as market conduct
parameters. The conjectural elasticities measure the overall market reaction to an
individual firm’s change in input demand and output supply. A review of the NEIO
studies revealed two features specifically related to the objective of this study. One is
that most of the attention in the NEIO literature has been paid to the imperfect
competition in either the input or output market. Research that considered both markets
simultaneously has been limited. The exceptions are several studies in the U.S. food
processing industry (Schroeter 1988; Azzam and Pagoulatos 1990; Wann and Sexton
1992; Alston, et al. 1997; Sexton 2000). Studies that only examined oligopsony or
oligopoly power ran the risk of understating the extent of the market power distortion or
erroneously attributing distortions to the wrong form of market power (Sexton 2000).
Another feature is that many NEIO models measured market power through the
estimation of static conjectural elasticities using time series data. One particularly
restrictive aspect of these studies is that they constrained the conjectural elasticities to be
constant throughout the sample period. Therefore, traditional NEIO models have been
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incapable in examining the dynamic market conduct parameters with changing industrial
structure. In solving this problem, some researchers expressed the conjectural elasticities
as a function of some market conduct explanatory variables to generate the time-varying
indices of market power. Several studies have been conducted with similar treatments
(Schroeter and Azzam 1991; Murray 1995b). However, there are some potential
problems associated with this procedure. For one, the time-varying conjectural elasticity
functions cannot contain too many explanatory variables; otherwise they will greatly
increase the convergence burden in the estimation, given the NEIO model has already
been complicated. Moreover, these time-varying conjectural elasticity functions lack
theoretical foundation in that the choice of the explanatory variables is arbitrary to some
extent.
For the paper industry, market power research and the application of NEIO
approach have been limited. Most of these studies were conducted in Canada, Finland,
Norway, and Sweden. Bernstein (1992) found competitive behavior in both the input and
output markets in the Canadian sawmill and paper industries after accounting for capital
adjustment costs. Ronnila and Toppinen (2000) applied duality to derive the factor
demand system, and the static estimation showed that the pulpwood market in Finland
had been competitive during the period 1965-1994. Based on data covering individual
Norwegian sawmills over the period 1974-1991, Stordal and Baardsen (2002) tested for
price-taking behavior incorporating cross-sectional effects and inter-temporal effects, and
market power was found for certain years. Bergman and Brannlund (1995) tested the
market power for the Swedish pulpwood market. The estimates of strongly time-varying
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conjectural elasticities indicated an unstable cartel situation. Bergman and Nilsson (1999)
found only weak evidence of market power for the Swedish pulp and paper industry by a
conjectural elasticity model using industry data for the 1970-1993 period.
Two studies were conducted for the paper industry in the United States. Murray
(1995b) studied oligopsony power in both the U.S. pulpwood and sawlog markets. He
modeled the wood as a quasi-fixed factor so the shadow price of the wood input could be
estimated from a flexible-form profit function. To explore the time-varying market
power indices, a polynomial function of fuel cost and average mill capacity was
established. His results suggested that the U.S. pulpwood market was more
oligopsonistic than the sawlog market. Based on the single-equation analysis, Yerger
(1996) examined the market power in the U.S. pulp export market. While imperfect
competition was found in chemical pulp export market, there was no clear support for
either perfect competition or the presence of market power in the U.S. sulphate pulp
export market.
Given the fact that empirical research dealing with the market power in the U.S.
paper industry is still sparse, there is great need to examine its industrial organization,
especially after the frequent restructuring activities in the form of mergers and
acquisitions in recent decades.

Theoretical Framework

Consider the U.S. paper industry with N firms. A representative firm, j, produces
a homogenous output (qj) using inputs of pulpwood (x1), labor (x2), capital (x3), and non-
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wood materials (x4) with prices w1, w2, w3, w4, respectively. Assume each firm exercises
some market power in purchasing the pulpwood input and in selling its paper products
output, but is a price taker in the markets for other inputs. Furthermore, assume each
firm is profit-maximizing so the optimum for firm j (j = 1, 2, … , N) is to choose xkj (k=1,
2, 3, 4) that maximizes its profits.
Based on the above assumptions, the NEIO approach could be explained as
follows. Let the jth firm’s production function be defined by

qj = f(x1j, x2j, x3j, x4j)

(3-1)

where qj is the output produced (i.e., paper products). Let the inverse market demand
curve facing the industry in its output market be given by

P = g(Q)

(3-2)

where P is the market price for paper products and Q = ∑ j =1 q j is the total industry
N

output. The inverse market supply function of the pulpwood input is given by

w1 = h(X1)

(3-3)

where w1 is the market price for pulpwood input and X1 = ∑ j =1 x1 j is total industry
N

pulpwood input. Thus, the jth firm’s profit could be calculated as

Π j = Pq j − ∑k =1 wk xkj
4

j = 1, 2, … , N

(3-4)

subject to Eq. (3-2) and (3-3). The first order conditions corresponding to this profit
maximization requires that the marginal product value of an input is equal to the
perceived marginal cost of an input, which yields the following equations:
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θj
w φ
w1
= (1 + ) f x1 j − 1 1 ,
η
P ε
P
θj
wk
= (1 + ) f xkj ,
η
P

k=1

(3-5)

j = 1…N, k = 2, 3, 4

(3-6)

where η = ∂Q × P /(∂P × Q) is the price elasticity of the output demand;

ε = ∂X 1 × w1 /(∂w1 × X 1 ) is the market price elasticity of the pulpwood input
supply;

θ j = ∂Q × q j /(∂q j × Q) is the jth firm’s conjectural elasticity in the paper
products output market;

φ j = ∂X 1 × x1 j /(∂x1 j × X 1 ) is the jth firm’s conjectural elasticity in pulpwood
input market; and

f xkj = ∂q j / ∂xkj is the marginal product of the kth input used by firm j.
In theory, the conjectural elasticities, i.e., θj and φj, provide benchmarks in
examining the price-taking behavior or degree of competitiveness (Appelbaum 1982). θj

∈ [0, 1] measures departures from competition in selling the output. θj = 0 denotes
perfect competition; θj = 1 denotes pure monopoly; and other values denote various
degrees of oligopoly power with higher values of θj denoting greater departures from
competition. φj plays a similar role in terms of procurement of the pulpwood input,
denoting possible perfect competition, monopsony, and various degrees of oligopsony
power.
In practice, absence of price and quantity data for the inputs and output at the firm
level generally results in considering the problem at the industry level. In doing so,
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however, an additional assumption must be maintained to make the preceding analysis
applicable to the behavior of the industry as a whole. The assumption is that, in
equilibrium, the conjectural elasticities are invariant across firms (Appelbaum 1982), i.e.,

θ1 = θ2 = … = θN = θ, and φ1 = φ2 = … = φN = φ, so that all the firms face identical
marginal prices.
Assuming identical conjectural elasticities across firms in equilibrium, the
aggregate analogue of the optimality conditions, Eq. (3-5) and (3-6) can be written as:
w1
w φ
θ
= (1 + ) f x1 − 1 ,
P
η
P ε

k=1

(3-7)

wk
θ
= (1 + ) f xk ,
P
η

k = 2, 3, 4.

(3-8)

The ratios of φ / ε and θ / η represent industry-wide indices of market power in the input
and output markets, respectively. They are also known as the classical Lerner index £
(Appelbaum 1982), which measure the price distortions and reflect the degree of
competitiveness from another perspective. In this study, the null hypothesis was that the
conjectural elasticities were equal to zero. Rejecting the null hypothesis would suggest
that the U.S. paper industry exerted market power on either the factor market, or the
products market, or both.

Econometric Model

In order to estimate the model described above, specifications of the functional
forms are needed. Selecting a functional form for the production function will lead to a
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group of empirical equations. It is desirable that the functional form does not impose
severe a priori constraints on the production characteristics in the industry. One function
that has been generally adopted is the transcendental logarithmic (translog) production
function (Christensen, et al. 1971):
4

4

4

ln Q = β 0 + ∑ β k ln X k + 1 2 ∑∑ β ki ln X k ln X i
k =1

(3-9)

k =1 i =1

where Xs are total industry inputs of pulpwood, labor, capital and non-wood materials, Q
is total industry output of paper products, and βs are the coeffecients. Translog
production function is symmetric in coefficients, i.e., β ik = β ki . From the above equation,
the marginal product for the kth input is
4

f xk = ( β k + ∑ β ki ln X i )
i =1

Q
Xk

k = 1, 2, 3, 4.

(3-10)

By substituting Eq. (3-10) into Eq. (3-7) and (3-8), and after rearranging, it led to
the following system of five equations
4

4

4

ln Q = β 0 + ∑ β k ln X k + 1 2 ∑∑ β ki ln X k ln X i
k =1

k =1 i =1

4
1+θ η
)( β1 + ∑ β1i ln X i )
S1 = (
1+φ ε
i =1
4

S2 = (1 + θ η )( β 2 + ∑ β 2i ln X i )
i =1
4

S3 = (1 + θ η )( β 3 + ∑ β 3i ln X i )
i =1
4

S4 = (1 + θ η )( β 4 + ∑ β 4i ln X i )
i =1
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(3-11)

where S k =

wk X k
(k = 1, 2, 3, 4) is the share equation for the kth input. The system of
PQ

equations could be estimated by the Iterative Seemingly Unrelated Regression system
procedure using time series data from 1955 to 2003. Furthermore, as exogenous point
estimates of the market price-elasticities, -0.4 and 0.3 were used for η and ε, respectively,
based on previous studies (Newman 1987; Newman and Wear 1993; Zhang and
Buongiorno 1997; Sun 2006a).
The above method can only estimate the static market conduct parameters, θ and

φ. It cannot measure and demonstrate the possible changes of the market conduct
parameters over time. To explore the dynamics of the market conduct parameters, a state
space model with time-varying parameters (TVPs) was formulated with the above five
equations specified as the signal equations and the market conduct parameters as the state
variables. The TVP approach allows for structural instability over time and takes the
possibility of parameter changes into consideration when estimating the model. The
approach can incorporate external shocks, such as policy and regime shifts, economic
reforms, and political uncertainties, into the system especially when the shocks are
diffuse in nature (Sun 2007). The approach of estimating system equations in the state
space model with TVPs has been applied to various economic issues, including demand
systems (Doran and Rambaldi 1997; Li, et al. 2006) and aggregate consumptions (Song,
et al. 1996).
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Since the signal equations must be linear in the contemporaneous state variables,
a further transformation needs to be made. In this study, a natural log value was taken to
the ratio

1+θ η
, and two corresponding state variables were defined as follows:
1+φ ε

SV1 = ln(1 + θ η )

(3-12)

SV 2 = ln(1 + φ ε ) .

(3-13)

Thus, the signal equations were specified as:
4

4

4

ln Q = β 0 + ∑ β k ln X k + 1 2 ∑∑ β ki ln X k ln X i
k =1

(3-14)

k =1 i =1

4

S1 = ( SV 1 − SV 2)( β 1 + ∑ β 1i ln X i )
i =1

4

S 2 = ( SV 2)( β 2 + ∑ β 2i ln X i )
i =1
4

S 3 = ( SV 2)( β 3 + ∑ β 3i ln X i )
i =1
4

S 4 = ( SV 2)( β 4 + ∑ β 4i ln X i )
i =1

The two state equations were specified by the random walk process, since in most cases it
is sufficient to capture the structural change in various economic models (Song and Witt
2000). Specifically, they were formulated as:
SV 1t = SV 1t −1 + δ

(3-15)

SV 2 t = SV 2 t −1 + σ

(3-16)

where δ and σ are error terms.
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Once the state space model was formulated, a convenient algorithm known as
Kalman filter, was used to estimate the model. Kalman filter is a recursive procedure for
calculating the optimal estimates of the state vector given the initial values and data
observed up to time t. After these two state variables were estimated, the time-varying
conjectural elasticities were transformed back and calculated as:

θ t = η (e SV 1 − 1)

(3-17)

φt = ε (e SV 2 − 1) .

(3-18)

t

t

Their corresponding variances were computed by the Delta method, which uses secondorder Taylor expansion to approximate the variance of a function of one or more random
variables. In this study, the variances of the state variables were given by
Var[ F ( SV )] = [ F ' ( E ( SV )] 2 Var[ SV ]

(3-19)

where F(·) is defined by Eq. (3-17) and (3-18), respectively.
The state space model is much more challenging to estimate than the ordinary
least square regression. The model convergence under maximum likelihood estimation
procedure depends on several factors: the specification and complexity of the signal and
state equations, the error structure, the initial conditions, and the parameter starting
values (Quantitative Micro Software 2005). Various starting values were tried initially
and the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) parameter estimates were finally
selected to obtain the state space estimates. The instrumental variables included the price
for each of the four inputs, the average mill capacity, per capita disposable income, the
production index for manufacturing, CR4 in the U.S. paper industry, and the time trend.
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The GMM and state space estimators utilized in this study were conducted using the
econometric software EViews 5.1.

Data

Annual data for the U.S. paper mills and paperboard mills (NAICS 32212/32213
or SIC 2621/2631) were constructed from 1955 to 2003. The pulp mills sector (NAICS
32211 or SIC 2611) was excluded for two reasons. One is that the output from the pulp
mills is an intermediate input in paper manufacturing so including this sector
overestimates the total industry output. The other is that most woodpulp is produced and
transferred within establishments in the paper and paperboard sectors (Murray 1995b).
The data were collected mainly from the following sources: Census of Manufacturing and
Annual Survey of Manufacturing for total value of paper products output, quantity of
labor input, total compensation of employment, and total cost of materials; Corporation
Source Book of Statistics of Income for capital quantity and capital cost; and USDA
Forest Service and Timber Mart-South for quantity of paper products output, and quantity
and price of pulpwood input.
Consistent with Murray’s (1995b) definition, total cost of labor equaled total
compensation for employees, which comprised payroll, mandated benefits such as social
security, and other employer-supplied benefits. Labor quantity was the sum of annual
production hours and total non-production workers times 2,000 hours per worker. Nonproduction workers were derived as total employees less production workers. Total cost
of materials includes cost of raw materials put into production or used for repair and
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maintenance, cost of products bought and sold in the same condition, cost of fuels
consumed for heat and power, cost of purchased electricity, and cost of contract work.
The non-wood materials bill was computed as the cost of materials less the cost of
pulpwood input. The value and cost of capital were calculated following the procedure
outlined in previous studies (Gollop and Roberts 1979; Azzam and Pagoulatos 1990).
Namely, the value of capital was calculated as the sum of net depreciable and depletable
assets, land and inventories; the cost of capital was calculated as the sum of interest,
depreciation, depletion and tax expenses. A two year average was taken since the
Internal Revenue Service data is based on fiscal year definition (i.e., from July to June)
against calendar year in this study. For the total establishment data, information from
Statistics of U.S. Businesses was also incorporated for the most recent years (1997-2003).
Table 3.1 listed the definitions, data sources, and statistical descriptions of the variables
used in this study.
Considering the international trade in forest products industry, the total quantities
of input and output were defined as domestic consumption of pulpwood and production
of paper products, respectively. In producing wood pulp and furthermore paper products,
pulpwood roundwood chips and residues, and most recently recycled wastepaper are used
as pulpwood input. Their corresponding quantities, which actually come from the
reported pulpwood receipts at paper and paperboard mills, were found in the publications
from USDA Forest Service. For pulpwood input prices data, volume weighted average
price of delivered softwood pulpwood, hardwood pulpwood, and chips and residues was
constructed and used as an approximation. For years 1955-1964, and 2003 when detailed
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Table 3.1
Variable definitions, data sources, and statistical descriptions
Variables
Value of industry
output
Quantity of paper
products output (Q)
Quantity of wood
input (x1)
Wood input price
(w1)
Wood input value
Labor cost
Labor quantity (x2)
Labor wage (w2)
Capital cost
Capital quantity (x3)
Capital price (w3)
Non-wood materials
cost
Price of non-wood
materials (w4)
Quantity of nonwood materials (x4)
Average mill
capacity
Per capita disposable
income
Production index for
manufacturing
CR4
Time trend

Definition and data sources
Industry value of shipments plus changes in inventory
(million $)a
Domestic production of paper and paperboard (thousand
short tons)b
Includes softwood and hardwood roundwood and
chips/residues (thousand std. cords)c
Volume weighted average price ($/std. cord)d

Mean
30,510.97

Std. Dev.
23,778.15

61,858.59

20,794.55

71,953.87

19,562.87

40.29

15.05

3,132.84
5,525.47
404.90

1,770.49
3,882.00
38.50

14.46
4,301.28

10.92
4,030.97

24,500.85

22,674.21

0.16
12,672.40

0.03
10,001.57

76.30

39.66

Cost of non-wood materials divided by the price index

136.97

59.33

Total production divided by total establishmentsg

114.24

47.09

10,666.33

8,444.80

53.11

24.62

28.79
25.00

9.23
14.29

Quantity times price of wood input
Total compensation of employees (million $)a
The sum of annual production hours and non-production
workers times 2,000 hours per worker (million hours)a
Labor cost divided by labor quantity
The sum of interest, depreciation, depletion and tax
expenses (million $)e
The sum of net depreciable and depletable assets, land and
inventories (million $)e
Capital cost divided by capital quantity
Total cost of materials less the cost of pulpwood input
(million $)a
Price index of intermediate inputs in manufacturingf

U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis
Federal Reserve Statistical Release, Board of Governors of
the U.S. Federal Reserve System
Share of value of shipments by the largest four companiesg
The calendar year minus 1954

a

Census of Manufacturing and Annual Survey of Manufacturing. Missing data were filled by interpolation.

b

Howard (2003) for year 1965-2002, supplemented by Agricultural Statistics.

c

Howard (2003) for year 1965-2002, supplemented by Adams, et al. (2006) and Agricultural Statistics.

d

Delivered price of softwood pulpwood, hardwood pulpwood, and pulp chips were from Timber MartSouth (Norris 1977-2001) and Adams, et al (1988).

e

Corporation Source Book of Statistics of Income.

f

Statistical Abstracts.

g

Establishments were reported in census year in Census of Manufacturing. For non-census year, figures

were filled by interpolation.
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volume data were not available the average price was assumed to change with PPI for
paper products. The delivered price data were obtained from Timber Mart-South since
there is no such nation-wide price index. Although Timber Mart-South only reports the
detailed price in the 11 southern states, according to the Agricultural Statistics near 50%
of annual timber removal is done in the south so it could well represent the nation wide
fluctuation of timber price. Delivered southern pine price served as a proxy since there is
no price reported for mixed softwood pulpwood. This is reasonable because almost a
half of softwood supply is derived from southern pine as reported in the Agricultural
Statistics. Finally, in converting the price for chips and residues from $/green ton to $/std.
cord, the factor 2.6 green tons/std. cord was used.

Empirical Results

The system statistics and parameter estimates from the nonlinear iterative
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimation were reported in Table 3.2. The model
fitted fairly well with regard to the single equation’s adjusted R2 values. The highest R2
was 0.976 for the production equation while the lowest was 0.637 for the share equation
for the non-wood input. By t-statistics, 12 of the 17 parameter estimates were significant
at the 5% level or better. The estimates for the conjectural elasticities fell in the right
range between 0 and 1, but were not significant. Theoretically, this implied that there
existed no market power either in the pulpwood input or the paper products output market.
However, this should be explained with caution because an implicit restriction that the
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conjectural elasticities remained constant over the sample period had been imposed on
the system, which might be too strong.
Table 3.2
Nonlinear iterative SUR parameter estimates for the U.S. paper industry model
Parameter
Estimate
Translog production function parameters
β0
5.149
β1
0.389
β2
-0.463
-0.086
β3
β4
1.026
β11
0.007
β12
0.026
β13
-0.012
β14
-0.075
β22
0.097
β23
0.011
β24
-0.066
β33
0.053
β34
-0.048
β44
0.220
Conjectural elasticity parameters
Output market
θ
0.000
Input market
φ
0.048
Indices of marker power
Output market
|θ/η|
0.001
Input market
φ/ε
0.160
Model performance
Equation
lnQ
S1
S2
S3
S4

Adj. R2
0.976
0.921
0.676
0.842
0.637

Std. Error

t-Statistic

p-Value

1.358
0.148
0.184
0.067
0.184
0.014
0.013
0.006
0.020
0.026
0.007
0.017
0.005
0.011
0.027

3.791
2.635
-2.524
-1.290
5.569
0.539
2.053
-2.051
-3.710
3.743
1.624
-3.813
10.799
-4.459
8.046

0.000
0.009
0.012
0.199
0.000
0.590
0.041
0.041
0.000
0.000
0.106
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.015

0.014

0.989

0.077

0.622

0.534

0.038

0.014

0.989

0.257

0.622

0.534

Durbin-Watson
0.606
0.252
0.882
0.662
0.365

Unlike the static estimation, the state space model with TVPs allows the
conjectural elasticities to change over time. The estimates of the parameters at the end of
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the sample period and the statistics for the model (e.g., log likelihood, Akaike
information criterion, Hannan-Quinn criterion) were reported in Table 3.3. As for the
production function, the number of parameter estimates that were significant at the 5%
level decreased to four. Nevertheless, the key coefficients, represented by the state
variables, were significant by z-statistics at the 10% level or better. Their final state
values were -0.346 and 0.058. When transformed back, the corresponding conjectural
elasticities were 0.018 for the pulpwood input market and 0.117 for the paper products
market, respectively.

Table 3.3
State space parameter estimates for the U.S. paper industry model
Parameter
Estimate
Signal equation parameters
β0
8.972
β1
-0.576
β2
-0.280
β3
-0.070
β4
3.005
β11
0.134
β12
-0.059
β13
0.054
-0.268
β14
β22
0.078
β23
0.023
β24
-0.044
β33
0.062
β34
-0.221
β44
0.563
State variables
Final State
SV1
-0.346
SV2
0.058
Log likelihood
Parameters
Diffuse priors

Std. Error
7.977
1.342
0.200
0.054
0.831
0.199
0.119
0.126
0.207
0.035
0.003
0.233
0.143
0.002
0.291
Root MSE
0.034
0.087

256.276
22
2

t-Statistic
1.125
-0.430
-1.401
-1.287
3.614
0.670
-0.493
0.426
-1.299
2.200
7.420
-0.190
0.433
-119.164
1.939
z-Statistic
-10.092
0.667
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criterion
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p-Value
0.261
0.668
0.161
0.198
0.000
0.503
0.622
0.671
0.194
0.028
0.000
0.850
0.665
0.000
0.053
p-Value
0.000
0.505
-9.562
-8.713
-9.240

Similarly, after we transformed the state variables at each stage back to the
conjectural elasticities, a more informative result, the variation of conjectural elasticities
over time, was generated. Computing t-statistics provides a test of the null hypothesis by
suggesting acceptance or rejection of price-taking behavior (conjectural elasticities equal
zero) at a specific level of significance. Time-varying conjectural elasticities and the
Lerner indices derived from the state space model estimation were presented in Table 3.4.
These results revealed that paper and paperboard mills tended to exert oligoposony and
oligopoly power in both the pulpwood input and paper products output markets from
1955 to 1977; after 1977 the paper and paperboard mills apparently exhibited near
perfectly competitive behavior in the pulpwood input market, but still remained
significantly oligopoly in the paper products output market.
The degree of oligopsony power (φ) had been increasing since 1955 till it reached
the peak of 0.315 with t-value of 8.00 in 1965. Then, it began declining for most of the
period thereafter. The φ value fell below the 5% level of significance after 1977, with the
only exception of the period spanning from 1983 through 1985, where t-values were
above 2.00. The period of no oligopsony power exertion connoted that the paper and
paperboard mills were acting competitively in purchasing pulpwood. In summary,
significant magnitude of oligopsony power exertion was observed for the earlier half of
the sample period while not for the later half. Most of the results were within
expectations and consistent with previous findings (Murray 1995b). However, it should
be mentioned that in the most recent years the estimations of φ ran slightly out of range,
i.e., negative but not significantly different from zero at the 0.1% level. It was not the
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Table 3.4
Market power indices for the U.S. paper industry from 1955 to 2003
Year

Oligopsony power (pulpwood input)
t-statistic
£
φ

1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

0.069
0.110
0.136
0.172
0.189
0.227
0.277
0.283
0.295
0.301
0.315
0.288
0.294
0.257
0.217
0.249
0.243
0.171
0.113
0.064
0.050
0.034
0.019
0.018
0.016
0.022
0.020
0.023
0.044
0.038
0.036
0.032
0.015
0.002
-0.001
-0.001
0.004
0.016
0.028
0.013
-0.001
0.003
-0.004
-0.005
-0.016
-0.018
-0.017
-0.002
0.018

2.91
4.61
5.25
5.94
6.33
6.80
7.31
7.55
7.67
7.82
8.00
7.95
7.86
7.65
7.27
7.43
7.44
6.41
5.15
3.68
2.91
2.15
1.25
1.14
1.01
1.40
1.28
1.41
2.39
2.20
2.08
1.83
0.94
0.10
-0.07
-0.06
0.23
0.97
1.60
0.84
-0.08
0.19
-0.26
-0.37
-1.27
-1.43
-1.25
-0.13
1.01

0.23
0.37
0.45
0.57
0.63
0.76
0.92
0.94
0.98
1.00
1.05
0.96
0.98
0.86
0.72
0.83
0.81
0.57
0.38
0.21
0.17
0.11
0.06
0.06
0.05
0.07
0.07
0.08
0.15
0.13
0.12
0.11
0.05
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.05
0.09
0.04
0.00
0.01
-0.01
-0.02
-0.05
-0.06
-0.06
-0.01
0.06
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Oligopoly power (paper products output)
θ
t-statistic
£
0.178
0.182
0.184
0.168
0.158
0.156
0.156
0.155
0.155
0.153
0.149
0.145
0.150
0.150
0.148
0.150
0.150
0.160
0.153
0.131
0.134
0.134
0.138
0.141
0.137
0.133
0.130
0.137
0.138
0.132
0.138
0.138
0.129
0.119
0.116
0.120
0.128
0.134
0.138
0.131
0.110
0.120
0.123
0.123
0.120
0.112
0.115
0.117
0.117

+∞
50.57
45.64
39.05
35.45
35.06
35.22
34.95
35.05
34.75
33.66
32.41
34.04
34.18
33.53
34.40
34.64
38.79
36.35
29.27
30.03
29.95
31.49
32.46
31.16
29.88
28.95
31.04
31.66
29.50
31.55
31.71
28.76
25.52
24.64
25.68
28.28
29.88
31.07
29.25
22.91
25.66
26.50
26.25
25.49
23.51
24.37
24.78
24.93

0.45
0.46
0.46
0.42
0.39
0.39
0.39
0.39
0.39
0.38
0.37
0.36
0.38
0.38
0.37
0.37
0.37
0.40
0.38
0.33
0.34
0.33
0.35
0.35
0.34
0.33
0.33
0.34
0.35
0.33
0.34
0.34
0.32
0.30
0.29
0.30
0.32
0.33
0.34
0.33
0.27
0.30
0.31
0.31
0.30
0.28
0.29
0.29
0.29

first time that this type of problem had been encountered in market power studies.
Schroeter and Azzam (1991) encountered the same situation when expressing the timevarying market conduct parameters as a linear function of the concentration ratios and the
average mill capacities, respectively, during estimation. Several factors might cause this
phenomenon. In this study, the most possible reason was that the model became too
complicated to estimate with accuracy after the introduction of the state variables given
limited annual observations.
The degree of oligopoly power (θ) was relatively stable, though also decreasing
over time. The highest value of θ was found in 1957 at 0.184 with a t-value of 45.64,
while the lowest value of θ was found in 1995 at 0.110 with a t-value of 22.91. All the θ
values in the sample period were highly significant at the 1% level. The plot of the time
trend of the conjectural elasticities with their standard errors gave a more intuitive
demonstration of the changes of market power exertion in the U.S. paper industry from
1955 to 2003 (Figure 3.1).
Since fixed price elasticities in pulpwood supply and paper products demand
markets were assumed and employed during the estimation, the variation of the Lerner’s
indices (£) followed that of the conjectural elasticities. However, the magnitudes of £
were relatively larger because the value of the corresponding price elasticities were both
less than one. Overall, during the sample period the proportion of the price distortion in
the paper products market had been prominent with £ values in excess of 0.29, whereas
that in the pulpwood market was severe for the early years in the sample period but
became insignificant since 1978.
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Market power in the U.S. paper industry

.4
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Oligopoly power (paper products output)
+/- 2 Standard error

Figure 3.1 The time trend of market power variation in the U.S. paper industry from 1955
to 2003.
In sum, the degree of both the oligopoly and oligopsony power in the U.S. paper
industry had been high and statistically significant at the 5% level or better till 1977.
After that, both of them exhibited decreasing trend for most of the time. While the
oligopoly power remained significant at the 1% level or better, the oligopsony power
nearly disappeared since 1978. Market power exertions in the U.S. paper industry might
reveal an inefficient allocation of resources. The U.S. paper industry had an incentive to
influence the quantities of pulpwood bought and the paper products sold so that the price
they paid for the pulpwood input was lower than its marginal product value, while the
price they asked for the paper products output was higher than its marginal cost.
Consequent reduction in consumer and producer surpluses due to imperfect competition
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in the pulpwood input and paper products output markets created deadweight losses to
society. That is, market power exertion caused a loss in social welfare.

Conclusions and Limitations

Most market power studies conducted in the forest products industry have focused
on either the pulpwood input market or the paper products output market. Nevertheless,
addressing the market power in both markets synchronously remains an important issue
as well. Further, the majority of forest products industry studies employed static tests of
market power. These tests are known to have strong limitations on the time-varying
characteristics of the market power indices. Besides, frequent and unprecedented huge
mergers and acquisitions in most recent decades have even exacerbated concentration in
the U.S. forest products industry. Consequently, the competition situation might be
affected, and thus the market power exertion might be quite different from that of
previous years. To incorporate the industry structure change that most recently occurred,
and at the same time explore the time-varying oligopsony and oligopoly power
simultaneously, this study formulated a state space model with TVPs and examined the
market behavior of the U.S. paper industry. Beginning with the identification of the
production function, the econometric analysis was based on the formulation and
estimation of a simultaneous-equation model consisting of a production function, firstorder conditions for factor employment, and two conjectural elasticities indicating the
industry’s oligopsony and oligopoly equilibria. Annual data from 1955 to 2003 were
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used in the estimation. This study extended the NEIO approach in examination of the
dynamics of market power indices.
Our results demonstrated that the degrees of imperfect competition on both the
pulpwood input and the paper products output markets have been falling for most of the
time during the past 49 years. While the oligopsony power dropped dramatically and
became insignificant at the 5% level in recent 30 years, the oligopoly power remained
significantly high at the 1% level over the whole sample period. To some extent, this was
consistent with earlier findings in the literature that the market power exertion depends
on the time period under consideration. Also this study evidenced that, against intuition,
higher concentration ratio would not necessarily lead to higher market power. In the case
of the U.S. paper industry, while the industry has become more and more concentrated,
its impact on the market behavior has not been unique. Analysis of the relationship
between the concentration ratios and the market power indices is another related
interesting topic, which merits further research.
It should also be noted that although NEIO approach can detect the degree of
market power, yet it cannot identify its sources (Bresnahan 1989; Connor 1998). While
the oligopoly power could be owned to the highly concentrated industry structure, the
rationale behind the oligopsony power can be complicated. One possible reason that was
widely postulated in previous studies is the prohibitive costs of transporting the bulky and
land-intensive raw wood materials due to spatial concentration of forest products industry
within timber producing regions (Newman and Wear 1990; Murray 1995a; Love and
Burton 1999). Additionally, rigorous environmental regulations, which drive up the
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already high capital costs of papermaking through the imposition of auxiliary costs of
compliance, monitoring and environmental clean-up, are perceived to be causal factors in
creating barriers to entry and increasing the potential market power in the U.S. paper
industry. During the time frame from the 1940’s to 1970’s, probably the most crucial
environmental laws were promulgated and implemented in the United States: Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (also known as Clean Water Act) of 1948, Clean Air Act of
1955, Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965, National Environmental Policy Act of 1970,
Resource Recovery Act of 1970, and Endangered Species Act of 1973.
The gradual downturn of market power exertion in the U.S. paper industry during
the 1970’s might be due to the coinstantaneous intensive antitrust investigations of paper
manufacturers. At that period of time, major paper companies paid over $535 million in
fines and damages for illegal price-fixing in cases brought before the U.S. Justice
Department and Federal Trade Commission (Draffan 1999). The decreasing market
power might also be an indication of the slowing demand for paper products during that
period. The decline in demand may have been caused by a number of market forces and
shocks, among which were housing starts, oil shocks, economic contraction, and policy
uncertainty surrounding the U.S.-Canada lumber trade dispute (Asinas 2001).
As in any other market power study of any industry, our results should be
interpreted in light of data constraints and model construction. First, the reliability of the
parameters estimated was greatly limited by the small sample size. A more appropriate
data set like quarterly data or firm level data would plausibly fit the model better. Second,
as a result of the limitation in EViews 5.1, rounding errors accumulated due to the
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transformations. More advanced software that allows the state variables to be nonlinear
in the signal equations will improve the accuracy of the estimation. Third, price
elasticities in the pulpwood supply and paper products demand should also be timevarying instead of remaining static each year as assumed in this study. However, when
they were allowed to change over time together with the conjectural elasticities, the
maximum likelihood estimation procedure could not achieve convergence. As an
alternative remedy, sensitivity analysis was carried out by trying several combinations of
the price elasticity values during the estimation, yet minor impacts were found on the
statistical results. Finally, as is well known, the choice of a flexible production or cost
function can affect the final results of any behavioral model, too. Hence, caution should
be made in using this study as a benchmark for policy intervention and government
regulation.
Overall, the state space model with TVPs demonstrated a new approach among
the NEIO literature in examining the time-varying market power indices. This approach
could also be employed in other similar economic issues. At the same time, this study
brings up several interesting questions given the exertion of market power in the U.S.
paper industry did change over time. Future research should examine what determines
the variation in market power; how market power influences the welfare of both the
forest landowners and paper products consumers; and its implication to forestry
investment as well as forest policy issues.
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS

The forest products industry, being an important contributor to the U.S. economy,
is worthy of numerous studies that probe its economic features. This thesis aimed to
evaluate the financial performance of the forest products industry and explore the market
behavior of the paper sector in the U.S. after M&As. To address this goal, event analysis
and NEIO approach were employed to examine the abnormal returns of the forest
products firms evolved in those M&As and the conjectural elasticities in the pulpwood
input and paper products output markets, respectively.
In Chapter II, abnormal returns were specified and estimated based on the market
model, firstly. After that, the abnormal returns were aggregated for every single firm
over the event window to get the cumulative abnormal returns, which provided a
benchmark on the firm level. Then, the cumulative abnormal returns were aggregated
again across firms to obtain the average cumulative abnormal returns, which served as an
indicator on the industry level. Secondly, determinants of the magnitude of the
cumulative abnormal returns were identified by running cross-sectional regressions on
the characteristics specific to the observations. Finally, changes in the systematic risk of
the individual firms before and after the M&As with transaction cost above $1 billion
were captured by the dummy variable introduced to the CAPM model.
The results from the abnormal return analysis suggested that the equity market
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reacted favorably to these M&As in the U.S. forest products industry. However, the
improvement of stock performance was not equal in terms of acquiring firms and target
firms. While the gains for the former were significant, those for the latter were not. This
indicated that these M&As in the U.S. forest products industry had brought considerable
increases to the target firms’ market values and were beneficial to their shareholders in
the short run.
From the estimation of the cross-sectional regressions, the position of a firm in the
M&A and the relative transaction size explained most of the variation of the cumulative
abnormal return. This further confirmed that the cumulative abnormal returns for the
target firms were larger compared to those for the acquiring firms. On the other hand, the
systematic risk for the acquiring firms in the selected 14 M&As had changed as revealed
by the CAPM model.
The methodology used in Chapter II emphasized the short term impact of the
M&As. In the long run, many other factors beyond the specification in this research may
influence the financial performance as well as the systematic risk of the forest products
firms in the United States, considering the complex structure of the equity market.
Overall, the study in this chapter improves our understanding of the financial
performance of the U.S. forest products industry in a global wave of ongoing
consolidation and restructuring within the industry over recent decades.
In Chapter III, the possibility of imperfect competition in the U.S. pulpwood input
and paper products output markets were analyzed by NEIO approach. First, the static
estimation of conjectural elasticities was conducted. Their corresponding estimated
values were not significantly different from zeros, which meant no market power exertion
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in both markets. However, this might not be the case because the conjectural elasticities
might change over time. In order to examine the dynamics of conjectural elasticities, an
innovative state space model with TVPs was created. The time-varying conjectural
elasticities were expressed by random walk and the model was estimated by the recursive
procedure Kalman filtering method. This way the structural specifications and the
identification of market conduct explanatory variables were avoided.
The presented evidence suggested the existence of oligopoly power in the paper
products output market through the whole sample period. On the contrary, the market
power exertion in the pulpwood input market ranged from oligopsony to near perfect
competition. Several factors may attribute to the variations of market power in the U.S.
paper industry, such as transportation costs, market forces and shocks, antitrust laws, and
environmental regulations. The existence of market power provides an incentive for the
upstream pulpwood suppliers (forest land owners) and the downstream paper products
buyers (retailers) to come into potentially Pareto-improving solution through cooperation,
by which the participating agents may strengthen their market position and can seek a fair
price for their products through bargaining. However, in most cases, the transaction costs
associated with organizing such cooperatives far outweigh the benefits (Asinas 2001).
Thus, the government may pursue other means or let the market work by itself.
Yet, our results should be interpreted in light of data constraints, software
restrictions, and econometric model specification and construction. Therefore, caution
should be paid to these results when used as a basis for policy intervention and
government regulation. In sum, the state space model with TVPs advanced the NEIO
literature in examining the time-varying market power. The results from this study will
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also improve our understanding of the market behavior after M&As in the U.S. forest
products industry in the past several decades.
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